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We explore the dynamics of expectations in international forest conservation and development pro-
grams, and the impacts and implications of (unfulfilled) expectations for actors involved. Early stages
of new international conservation and development programs, often involving pilot projects designed
to test intervention concepts at village level, are characterized by large amounts of resources and atten-
tion, along with high expectations of success. However, evidence shows that these early expectations are
rarely fulfilled. Despite this repeated pattern and growing engagement with expectations in critical con-
servation and development literature, little is known about the dynamics of expectations in conservation
and development pilot projects. We address this knowledge gap first by exploring concepts from the soci-
ology of expectations. We then unpack expectations in a case study of REDD+ pilot projects in Tanzania,
using extensive qualitative data reflecting the perspectives and experiences of a wide range of actors
involved. Our study finds that expectations play a performative role, mobilizing actors and resources,
despite uncertainty identified among policy-makers and practitioners. We also find that once raised,
expectations are dynamic and continually mediated by actors and social contexts, which conflicts with
attempts to ‘manage’ them. We argue therefore that a trade-off exists between fully piloting new initia-
tives and raising expectations. We also argue that failure to address this trade-off has implications
beyond pilot project objectives and timelines, which are experienced most acutely by village communi-
ties. We argue for more critical engagement with expectations and the embedding of accountability for
expectations in conservation and development practice. Our findings also challenge the discourse of
‘needing’ to pilot, which prioritizes awareness, impact and innovation without fully considering the
potential negative impact of unfulfilled expectations.
 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an openaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Large scale, internationally-led programs have repeatedly been
framed as necessary solutions to forest governance challenges in
the tropical Global South (Adger, Benjaminsen, Brown, &
Svarstad, 2001; Mace, 2014; Redford, Padoch, & Sunderland,
2013). Programs have included integrated conservation and devel-
opment programs (ICDPs), participatory forest management (PFM),
payments for ecosystem service (PES) and, most recently, reducing
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and enhanc-
ing forest stocks through improved forest conservation and man-agement (REDD+). These programs are designed to tackle
environmental problems such as biodiversity loss and climate
change, as well as to support community development challenges.
These problems and challenges are defined in such a way that tech-
nical, multiple-win and increasingly market-based solutions are
required to solve them (Igoe & Brockington, 2007; Li, 2007). The
early stages of these new programs, often involving village level
pilot projects, are characterized by large amounts of money,
resources, attention and high expectations (Fletcher, Dressler,
Büscher, & Anderson, 2016; Redford et al., 2013). The reality of
these initiatives rarely lives up to the high early-stage expecta-
tions, and so subsequent solutions that require new policy models
and technical programs are sought (Li, 2007; Mosse, 2005; Redford
et al., 2013). As such, a number of academics have conceptualized
these programs as ‘conservation fads’ (Fletcher et al., 2016; Lund,
Sungusia, Mabele, & Scheba, 2016), defined by Redford et al.
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and then abandoned’.
Discussion about the relationship between these international
programs and expectations is increasing amongst both practition-
ers and academics, with expectations defined as imagined ideas
about the future that circulate through social interaction
(Konrad, 2006; Van Lente, 2012). Most recently, the focus of this
discussion has been on REDD+, which has stalled at the end of
the pilot phase leaving many early expectations unfulfilled (Lund
et al., 2016; Sills et al., 2014). It is argued that the early stages of
REDD+ have led to the development of an ‘economy of expecta-
tions’, whereby local level processes, realities and visions for the
future are altered through involvement with global, market-
based conservation programs (Dressler, 2017; Fletcher et al.,
2016). As a result, expectations and the management of expecta-
tions have been highlighted as one of the biggest challenges of
REDD+ pilot project implementation (Atela, 2015; Sunderlin
et al., 2014), with practitioners now required to ‘develop strategies
to deal with the backlash’ (Fletcher et al., 2016, p. 674).
Despite this interest in expectations, there has been little
detailed exploration of how they are produced, how they circulate
and the impact they have throughout the different stages of con-
servation and development projects. Thus more understanding is
needed about what the science and technology (STS) literature
calls the ‘sociology’, or ‘dynamics’, of expectations in this context
(Brown & Michael, 2003; Van Lente, 1993). Exploring the dynamics
of expectations is necessary for a full understanding of social
change (Borup, Brown, Konrad, & Van Lente, 2006). We posit that
this is particularly relevant in relation to pilot projects, which are
often used to test new international conservation and development
programs at the local level in order to generate quick and tangible
results, to influence policy and to generate further donor funds
(Adams, 2003; Garí, 2013; Vreugdenhil, Slinger, Thissen, & Rault,
2010). As such, pilot projects require buy-in, engagement and
action from all of the actors involved and so drive social change.
Yet they rarely come with a guarantee of continued funding and
activity post-pilot.
We address this knowledge gap first by reviewing sociology of
expectations literature, which is primarily drawn from the field
of STS. We identify core themes and characteristics that are rele-
vant to international forest conservation and development pro-
grams. We then use this to investigate a case study of REDD+
pilot projects in Tanzania, drawing primarily on in-depth narrative
interviews conducted with actors from global to village levels and
collected after the pilot projects were phased out. This includes
detailed investigation of two pilot project case studies, which pro-
vide empirical evidence of contrasting approaches to pilot projects
and expectations. Through this analysis, we contribute to a better
understanding of the dynamics of expectations in conservation
and development practice, as well as the dynamics of expectations
more broadly. In doing so, we also contribute to a deeper under-
standing of pilot projects, and other interventions, as agents and
outcomes of social change. This approach contrasts with common,
instrumental forms of project evaluations that focus on the
impacts of interventions on forest governance or performance
against project objectives (Li, 2007; Mosse, 2005). As such we also
provide new and useful insights to policy-makers and practitioners
involved in international forest conservation and development
projects.2. The sociology of expectations
Expectations can be defined as imagined ideas about the future
that are produced, circulated and mediated through social interac-
tion, resulting in social change (Berkhout, 2006; Konrad, 2006; VanLente, 2012). Actors’ actions and decisions are always made in rela-
tion to expected outcomes and consequences (Berkhout, 2006; Van
Lente, 2012). Expectations can be both positive and negative, and
both individual and collective, and are therefore both context-
specific and related to broader shared or collective visions
(Konrad, 2006). Collective expectations develop in relation to
shared ‘imaginaries’, which are defined as ‘imagined forms of social
life and social order that centre on the development or fulfilment
of innovative scientific and/or technical projects’ (Jasanoff et al.,
2007). New conservation and development programs are often
framed within a multiple-win rhetoric, towards imaginaries of
international forest governance for the benefit of all (Igoe &
Brockington, 2007). And it is argued that market-based solutions
such as REDD+ heighten these dynamics due to their emphasis
on future speculation and their transnational, abstract nature,
which is less aligned with local contexts than previous programs
(Dressler, 2017).
Early stages of new innovation or technological development
both drive and are driven by hyper expectations, or hype, which
can be defined as unreasonable and unachievable expectations of
what the new innovation can deliver (Brown, 2003). As such, a
sense of urgency ensues, driven by both fear of environmental
harm and the imaginaries of future conservation (Brown &
Michael, 2003; Büscher & Dressler, 2007). Newness is fetishized
and as such ideas that are framed as being new, different and dis-
tinct are favored over the advancement of existing solutions, not
least because shortfalls associated with past solutions are erased
(Brown & Michael, 2003; Brown, 2003). As such, Mosse (2004, p.
640) argues that in development ‘the intense focus on the future,
on new beginnings, is rarely moderated by an analysis of the past’.
These new beginnings often require the use of show or pilot pro-
jects to bring new policy to life (Igoe & Brockington, 2007). Hype
and expectations can therefore focus energy and attention on one
new solution, becoming a barrier to critical thinking, to alternative
solutions and to approaches that favor incremental change (Brown,
2003).
Expectations can be described as being performative in that
their existence mobilizes both actors and resources, and as such
they provide an important function in the early stages of innova-
tion (Borup et al., 2006; Brown & Michael, 2003; Konrad, 2006).
They can coordinate and broker relationships between a wide
range of actors – both horizontally (for example between policy-
makers) and vertically across different scales from the global to
the local (Borup et al., 2006). As collective expectations develop,
‘communities of promise’ build up around them (Brown, 2003, p.
5) and actors join these discursive communities despite individual
uncertainties and reservations, often to ensure that they do not get
left behind (Konrad, 2006; Van Lente, 2012). In this sense, econo-
mies of expectation can develop in which new realities are created
(Borup et al., 2006). Expectations have thus been defined as ‘force-
ful presence’ (Van Lente, 2012, p. 773). This forceful presence can
be seen in the context of global, market-based conservation mech-
anisms that create new social structures, nature valuations and
imaginaries that in turn encourage more activity and higher expec-
tations (Dressler, 2017; West, 2006).
There is much discussion in both the STS literature and critical
conservation and development literature about the level of inten-
tion of raising expectations in relation to their performative role.
On the one hand, it can be framed as an inevitable and unavoidable
outcome of social interaction and innovation (Konrad, 2006). Once
something is enacted, it becomes part of a reality that is both
linked to the actor’s original intentions but also combines with
other actors and contexts to take on a life of its own that often
results in unintended consequences (West, 2006). However, others
argue that innovators and policy-makers deliberately raise expec-
tations in order to mobilize resources and enrol actors into com-
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2006), particularly in conservation and development where actors
such as NGOs and government agencies have to compete for scarce
resources, such as donor funds, legitimacy and reputation (Li,
1999).
Elevated expectations, created by hype associated with early
stages of innovation, results in hype and disappointment cycles
(Borup et al., 2006). Actors’ efforts to sustain expectations are over-
whelmed by the reality of underlying issues and so communities of
promise collapse (Brown, 2003; Van Lente, 1993). This results in
what Mosse (2004) refers to as an unintended but inevitable gap
between international development policy and the realities of
implementation. Repeated cycles of new international conserva-
tion and development programs, or ‘fads’ (Redford et al., 2013)
therefore result in repeated hype and disappointment cycles. Dis-
appointment can then lead to outcomes including apportioning
blame, disillusionment, damaged credibility of innovators and
policy-makers, and adverse effects on future innovations (Brown
& Michael, 2003; Brown, 2003; Sung & Hopkins, 2006; Van Lente,
1993). Such outcomes could include conservation and develop-
ment NGOs losing their legitimacy (Dressler, 2017), resistance to
future projects at the local level (Leach & Scoones, 2015; Li,
2007) and environmental destruction by villagers whose expecta-
tions of project involvement have not been met (West, 2006).
However, in some cases new cycles of hype provide a protected
space for new innovation and past disappointment is forgotten
(Borup et al., 2006; Konrad, 2006). Although cycles of expectation
and disappointment can be conceptualized as inevitable, their
impacts and implications are highly contextual, related to the
social dynamics of expectations.
The initial framing of the innovation by those developing and/or
selling it impacts the development of collective and individual
expectations (Sung & Hopkins, 2006). However, expectations are
continually mediated by actors’ past experiences, social interac-
tions, networks and activities, and social framings (Brown &
Michael, 2003; Leach & Scoones, 2015; Sung & Hopkins, 2006).
For example, West (2006) finds that villagers engage with projects
with the understanding that they are entering into long-term,
reciprocal, social relationships with practitioners towards imagi-
naries of development and progress. This results in disappointment
once projects end and these expectations are not met. Expecta-
tions, uncertainty and disappointment can be conceptualized as
dynamic, continually influencing and being influenced by social
discourse and interactions (Konrad, 2006). As such, attempts by
practitioners to manage expectations once they have been raised
are likely to be unsuccessful (Weszkalnys, 2008).
A relationship between actors’ proximity to the production of
knowledge, and their levels of uncertainty and expectations, can
also be identified. Brown and Michael (2003) find that actors clos-
est to the production of knowledge (such as innovators and policy-
makers) have high levels of uncertainty about the success of the
new idea or solution and, as a result, low expectations. Actors fur-
thest away from knowledge production (such as medical patients
and recipients of development projects) tend to have low uncer-
tainty and therefore the highest levels of expectations. Those clos-
est to knowledge are the source of raised expectations, yet
disappointment affects the user groups furthest away from knowl-
edge, highlighting the asymmetrical nature of negative impacts of
unrealistic expectations (Brown &Michael, 2003; Van Lente, 2012).
In Tanzania, evidence suggests that the REDD+ pilot phase fell well
short of initial expectations and promises of change (Benjaminsen,
2014; Lund et al., 2016; Svarstad & Benjaminsen, 2017). As such,
Brown (2003) argues that a reworking of economies of expectation
is required in order that the uncertainties of those closet to knowl-
edge become more transparent; particularly to those most nega-
tively impacted by hype and disappointment cycles.3. The case study of REDD+ pilot projects in Tanzania
REDD+ pilot projects in Tanzania are used as an instrumental
case study or a bounded case that is explored in detail in order
to illustrate an issue of concern (Creswell, 2012). REDD+ is a mech-
anism developed by the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) based on the principle that through car-
bon markets, or international donor funding, developing countries
are financially rewarded for preventing deforestation, protecting
forests and hence increasing global carbon stocks. When the initial
pilot stages commenced in many countries following the Bali
Action Plan in 2007, there were high hopes internationally that
REDD+ would achieve multiple wins by contributing to global cli-
mate change mitigation targets, biodiversity protection and local
forest conservation and development objectives (Phelps, Friess, &
Webb, 2012; Visseren-Hamakers, McDermott, Vijge, & Cashore,
2012).
Large amounts of funding and resources were employed to get
countries ‘REDD+ ready’ and pilot projects implemented in order
to test REDD+ mechanisms (Lund et al., 2016; Sunderlin et al.,
2014). Critical voices also emerged during the early stages, with
actors including academics, indigenous groups and practitioners
warning of potential human rights, land tenure and justice issues
(Chhatre et al., 2012; Clements, 2010; Corbera, 2012; Lang, 2010)
As the REDD+ ready phase and associated pilot projects continued,
it became evident that the mechanism was harder to implement
than expected and that global REDD+ funding mechanisms were
not yet in place (Lund et al., 2016). As such, many projects have
stalled, been abandoned, or have evolved into more traditional
conservation and development projects that no longer focus on
monetary incentives for carbon storage and sequestration (Sills
et al., 2014). REDD+ therefore makes a timely and relevant case
study through which to explore expectations in the early stages
of forest conservation and development initiatives.
In Tanzania, the REDD+ (known locally as MKUHUMI) readiness
phase was active between 2009 and 2014. It was supported by US
$80 million of bilateral funding from Norway’s International Cli-
mate and Forest Initiative (NICFI) and managed by the Norwegian
Embassy in Tanzania (Kaijage & Kafumu, 2016). Additional
national-level strategic support was given by the UN and World
Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (REDD-Desk, 2017). The
Norwegian funding supported a national REDD+ Task Force made
up primarily of government actors, thematic working groups con-
sisting of government, civil society and private sector actors, and a
REDD+ Secretariat based at the University of Dar es Salaam. These
institutions supported the Vice President’s office (VPO) in the
development of the Tanzanian REDD+ strategy document (VPO,
2013). Funding was also used to support a large number of
research projects and to enable the implementation of nine pilot
projects, seven of which reached completion. A mix of interna-
tional NGOs and well-established national NGOs were chosen to
implement the projects, which lasted between four and five years.
The objectives of the pilot projects included testing REDD+ mech-
anisms with communities in a wide range of contexts, getting com-
munities ready for REDD+, delivering widespread stakeholder
awareness and involvement in REDD+, delivering REDD+ results
such as emission reduction, and supporting national policy-
making (NIRAS, 2015).
The NGOs took very different approaches to piloting REDD+,
with some aiming to meet all objectives and fully test the mecha-
nism and others choosing to focus on only a few elements. Two
individual case studies were chosen to explore expectations in
REDD+ pilot projects in more detail and to reflect two contrasting
approaches to piloting. Tables 1 and 2 present the key facts related
to these two individual pilot project case studies. It is argued that
the pilot projects achieved some objectives, generated useful
Table 1
Kilosa project key facts.1
Kilosa
 Implemented by Tanzania Forest Conservation Group (TFCG) and Mtandao wa Jamii wa Usimamizi wa Misitu Tanzania (MJUMITA) - Tanzania Community Forest
Network
 Piloted with villages that had had few previous (non-governmental) interventions
 Community-managed forests and community-based forest management (CBFM)
 Active for five years (until December 2014)
 Aimed to demonstrate a pro-poor approach to improved village forest management through international carbon financing
 Fully tested REDD+ mechanisms and aimed to get communities ‘REDD ready’
 Followed global carbon standards and processes with the aim to complete a project document and gain verification for future carbon trading
 Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) consultation undertaken at the start of the project
 Tested benefit-sharing mechanisms by completing a trial carbon payment (two trial payments were planned but only one completed due to technical issues)
 Established Community Based Forest Management (CBFM), which involved village committees, land use plans and establishment of Village Land Forest Reserves
(VLFRs) for protection under REDD+
 Livelihood projects including conservation agriculture and micro-finance groups
 Carbon measurement, reporting and verification (MRV)
 High awareness of MKUHUMI and wider project among villagers. High levels of participation
 Main messages communicated to villagers: potential negative impacts of deforestation and degradation, information about carbon and REDD+ including potential
benefits
 At time of data collection new sustainable charcoal project started in Village K2 with plans to expand to K1. Local NGO staff supporting the communities to continue
with livelihood projects where possible, but no additional donor support for REDD+ projects
1 Compiled from own data and NIRAS (2015).
Table 2
Rungwe project key facts.1
Rungwe
 Implemented by Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) Tanzania
 Longstanding relationship between NGO and the villages
 Protected area management
 Active for four years (until June 2014)
 Focus on science/research and aimed to address the ‘+’ of REDD+ by addressing drivers of deforestation and forest degradation through economic and livelihood
activities
 Did not trial carbon payments nor go through FPIC or carbon standards processes
 Framed as a continuation of existing forest conservation and development programs
 Education campaign to villages and schools, established woodlots and livelihood projects such as bee-keeping
 MRV
 Low awareness of MKUHUMI among villagers but general awareness of individual project elements, such as bee-keeping and education. Direct participation only by
people involved in committees and groups (aside from education campaign)
 Main messages communicated to villagers: potential negative impacts of deforestation and forest degradation. Some information about REDD+ and carbon, but not
carbon finance
 At time of data collection continuing and expanding some livelihood projects with new donor funding
1 Compiled from own research and NIRAS (2015).
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zania is feasible (NIRAS, 2015). However aside from investment
into the National Carbon Monitoring Centre (NCMC), continued
funding via donor support or carbon finance was not in place when
the pilot projects were completed and national plans for a phase
two of REDD+ were not clear (Lund et al., 2016). As such, most of
the pilot projects ended with little scope for continuation through
REDD+, although many of the NGOs involved continued working
with the communities through other projects and funding.4. Research design
An interpretive, actor-orientated approach to case study
research was taken (Long, 2003). Methodologically this involves
using ethnographic methods to unpack lived experiences from
the perspectives of individual actors and actor groups, and empha-
sizes the interplay between outside influences such as
internationally-led interventions, and the different realities, per-
ceptions, social interests, and relationships of actors involved
(ibid.). We agree with Cooper and Pratten (2015) that ethnography
should draw heavily on individual narrative in order to do justice
to participants’ lived experiences. This article is based primarily
on 70 in-depth, narrative interviews conducted with a wide range
of different actors involved in the pilot projects. These narrativeswere collected between September 2015 and May 2016 and were
selected to reflect a broad range of respondent demographics, char-
acteristics and viewpoints and included international, national,
regional, district and village-level actors. Additional ethnographic
data was collected during this period, as well as during additional
visits to Tanzania between September and October 2014 and
March and August 2015, in order to support the narrative inter-
views and ensure credibility of the research (Lincoln & Guba,
1985). The two individual pilot project case studies outlined in
Tables 1 and 2 were chosen to provide rich data or ‘thick’ descrip-
tion (Geertz, 1994) of project level and village actor and experi-
ences, and in order to reflect two very different approaches to
piloting. Data was collected in two villages involved in each pilot
project. They are referred to as K1 and K2 in Kilosa and R1 and
R2 in Rungwe for confidentiality reasons. These villagers were
selected following key informant interviews with national and dis-
trict NGO representatives, regional and district government repre-
sentatives and academics, and consulting NGO project documents.
They were selected as villages that had been most fully involved in
the pilot projects. Table 3 summarizes the data collected.
Most of the data, including the narratives, was collected after
the pilot projects had ended, with the objective of gathering reflec-
tions of the whole pilot process, as well providing insights into the
impact of pilot projects beyond their completion date. It is noted
that the expectation narratives represent the actor framings at that
Table 3
Data collected.
Narrative Interviews 7 international actors: consultants, Embassy (donor), UN
15 National actors: NGO representatives from six implementing NGOs, national government (including Task Force members), academics
(including REDD+ Secretariat)
24 actors in pilot project case study one (Kilosa): NGO field practitioners (TFCG), district government, cross-section of villagers from leaders
to marginalized people (two villages)
24 actors in pilot project case study two (Rungwe): NGO field practitioners (WCS), regional and district government, cross-section of villagers
from leaders to marginalized people (two villages)
Supporting data Meeting observations: national level (REDD+ workshop October 2014, and Lessons Learned presentations August 2015), village level
(including village meeting and committee meetings)
Document reviews: promotional material from WCS and TFCG, NGO project documents, official donor evaluation reports
Formal and informal non-narrative interviews and conversations: from international to village-level actors
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happened during and since the pilot projects (Brown & Michael,
2003). It was also noted that at the start of data collection, the lead
researcher and research assistants were automatically linked to
REDD+ by villagers, particularly in Kilosa. We tried to overcome
this by spending time prior to each interview explaining our posi-
tion as independent academic researchers, however we note that a
belief that we may have been able to directly influence REDD+ may
have influenced some of the responses. The data was analyzed in
two phases: inductively then deductively. Firstly, narrative content
analysis was used in order to understand the experiences of actors
and the meanings they attributed to these experiences (Elliott,
2005). Storylines around expectations were identified within each
narrative, with storylines defined as part of a narrative that allows
actors to ‘give meaning to specific physical or social phenomena’
(Hajer, 1995, p. 56). The actor storylines were then compared
and analyzed inductively to find patterns. During the second phase,
these narratives were analyzed using the aforementioned dynam-
ics of expectations concepts.
5. Discussion of key findings
5.1. The early stages of REDD+ in Tanzania: hype, urgency and
expectations
When reflecting back on the early stages of the REDD+ pilot pro-
jects in Tanzania, national and international actors identified high
levels of hype or hyper expectations, which are highlighted by
Brown (2003) as being a core characteristic of early innovation.
International actors saw REDD+ as an opportunity for Tanzania to
establish its position internationally as a leader in REDD+ knowl-
edge and practice. Expectations of continuation post-pilot were
identified among national actors, including government officials
and NGOs. These expectations of continuation included more fund-
ing from donors, a national level REDD+ program spearheaded by
the government, and continued funding for communities via car-
bon markets, and were largely related to the ‘opportunity for com-
munities to benefit, to take carbon as one of the products of the
forest’.1 There were also expectations that REDD+ would provide a
solution to forest conservation in Tanzania and become a source of
much-needed, ongoing, financial support for the forestry depart-
ment. One government official reflected that ‘people thought ‘ah
okay, the forests are now safe because of REDD”. . . even my director
had that notion.’2 REDD+ was framed as a multiple-win solution to
forest governance issues, producing collective expectations of a
market-led solution towards imaginaries of abundant resources
and well-protected forests (Igoe & Brockington, 2007; Leach &
Scoones, 2015; Lund et al., 2016). This was despite the fact that fund-
ing was secured for a pilot phase only, demonstrating the over-1 Interview, national government official/project implementer, 3 March 2016.
2 Interview, government official/Task Force member, 14 March 2016.inflated expectations inherent in the hype during the early stages
of new innovation (Brown, 2003).
A sense of urgency (Brown & Michael, 2003; Büscher & Dressler,
2007) was also identified by national actors when reflecting on the
early stages of the projects, which was cited by Embassy employ-
ees as influencing the decision to have NGOs lead the pilot projects
(as opposed to the Tanzanian government). One of the actors
involved in the development of the pilot projects reflected that
‘the whole international thing’3 driving REDD+ meant that the pilot
projects began before key actors such as NGOs and government offi-
cials were fully aware of what REDD+ involved. Part of the original
donor strategy was to build on the existing PFM tradition in Tanza-
nia but despite this, much of the emphasis was put on the new ele-
ments of REDD+, particularly in relation to carbon payments. The
NGOs ‘were encouraged to include front-loaded payments within
their budgets to test payment and benefit sharing arrangements in
the expectation of making longer-term carbon sales’ (Blomley
et al., 2016, p. 2). This aligns with Brown and Michael (2003)’s argu-
ment that by emphasising newness, innovation gains more traction,
funds and attention, and that this in addition drives higher expecta-
tions. This also allowed the REDD+ project to be seen as a new begin-
ning and so failures of past programs could be overlooked (Igoe &
Brockington, 2007; Mosse, 2004).
This early-stage hype and associated expectation influenced
and informed the activity of many of the national actors during
the early stages of the REDD+ pilot projects. This included develop-
ment of a national media campaign to raise awareness of REDD+,
and the framing of the pilot projects by the NGOs: this forest will
pay you [the villagers]. Not only for one year, but will pay you con-
tinuously! I mean this is a bank account. You are saving money and
getting interest. So I think [there was] an expectation that OK by
the time the project is ending, we will have our project document,
we will have our process verified, and we’ve qualified to be paid.4
In Kilosa, a range of actors including villagers, local leaders, dis-
trict government and local NGO staff reflected on high expecta-
tions at the start of the process, during which they were visited
by the Task Force, the Embassy and the NGO, and were involved
in the FPIC process. These expectations were both in relation to
outcomes of the pilot project itself, such as village education and
development, and assumptions of future benefits of REDD+, such
as ongoing carbon payments and improved local climate condi-
tions. During the early stages, negative expectations related to
the project were also identified among villagers in both K1 and
K2. These included worries that ‘these Europeans have come from
their home countries to come and steal our land’,5 that people would
be moved from their farms and that wild animals would be intro-
duced to the area. As such, strong positive and negative expectations
existed alongside one another during the initial stages of the Kilosa3 Interview, consultant, 22 February 2016.
4 Interview, embassy employee, 7 March 2016.
5 Interview, man in 50s, village leader, Kilosa, 6 May 2016.
10 Interview, national government official and Task Force Member, 3 March 2016.
11 Interview, man in 30s, village leader, Kilosa, 2 April 2016.
12 Interview, international consultant, 6 March 2016.
13 It is noted that Vatn et al. (2017) experienced less conflict related to relocation in
380 K. Massarella et al. /World Development 109 (2018) 375–385pilot projects (Konrad, 2006). Factors such as negative past experi-
ences of government conservation programs and proximity to strict
national wildlife parks drove these negative expectations, or fears,
illustrating the mediation of expectations by actors and contexts
(Konrad, 2006; Sung & Hopkins, 2006).
Narratives of actors involved in the REDD+ pilot project in
Rungwe reflect very different expectation dynamics at the start
of the project. At this time expectations in relation to carbon pay-
ments began to develop among regional, district and village gov-
ernment actors as a result of national media campaigns,
attendance of meetings on REDD+ and visits from the Task Force.
However, the implementing NGO decided not to focus on REDD+
specific mechanisms such as trial carbon payments, preferring to
focus on research and livelihood activities. This was largely as a
result of concerns about ‘making promises to communities that you
can’t deliver’6 and maintaining their legitimacy among communities
with whom they have a longstanding relationship. The NGO did not
go through a village-wide consultation process at the start of the
project, gaining consent from village leaders, and did not focus on
widespread participation in the livelihood projects. Broader village
participation was encouraged in the education programs, which
framed the project and forest conservation as being about reducing
the risk of drought, floods and rising temperatures,7 without directly
focusing on carbon. As a result, awareness of and participation in
the REDD+ pilot project among actors outside of village government
and committees was low, and village level actors spoke of very few
expectations of the pilot project. Expectations can therefore be con-
ceptualised as a product of the framing of those who are ‘selling’ the
new idea (Sung & Hopkins, 2006); in this case the NGOs in Kilosa and
Rungwe, who took very different approaches to the pilot projects.
5.2. The performative function of expectations
The performative function of expectations (Borup et al., 2006;
Brown & Michael, 2003; Konrad, 2006; Sung & Hopkins, 2006)
can be identified through national level and Kilosa actor narratives,
driving and being driven by the aforementioned international and
national level hype, sense of urgency, and assumptions of a REDD+
future. Actors were enrolled into ‘communities of promise’ (Brown,
2003, p. 5), both horizontally at the national level, and also verti-
cally across regional, district and village levels in Kilosa. At the
international and national level, these discursive communities of
promise developed despite personal uncertainties of a number of
actors. These uncertainties were largely related to the unknown
nature of carbon financing mechanisms central to REDD+ . Differ-
ences between lower personal levels of expectations and much
higher collective expectations at the time were identified
(Konrad, 2006). Reflections of a number of national level actors
suggest that collective expectations were performative in that they
enrolled actors into communities of promise and project engage-
ment despite their personal concerns. There were also suggestions
that they resulted in an uncritical approach to piloting, as identi-
fied by Brown (2003)
‘I sometimes feel guilty that I was part of it. You know, some people
[were] just preaching like priests, the way they preach about God
and Jesus Christ and all those kind of things, but without having
a critical analysis about what it really means.’8
At the international and national level uncertainty was in fact
performative, acting as one of the driving forces behind the choice
to pilot, in order to avoid ‘policy-making in a void’.9 The framing of6 Interview, national NGO representative, 18 December 2015.
7 Taken from promotional materials distributed by the NGO in Rungwe.
8 Interview, Secretariat member, 17 March 2016.
9 Interview, consultant, 22 February 2016.REDD+ as new, unknown and filled with future possibilities mobi-
lized a large amount of funding and activity and led to the aforemen-
tioned perceived need to pilot to bring this new policy to life (Igoe &
Brockington, 2007).
In Kilosa, expectations were also performative and can be seen
to be both the cause and outcome of change within the district and
the villages (Borup et al., 2006; Van Lente, 2012). Communities of
promise built up around the expectations of village development,
ongoing carbon payments, and improvements to local ecosystem
services (through better forest conservation). Actors within these
communities of promise, who included the Task Force, district offi-
cials and local leaders, reassured villagers that they would not be
moved from their farms, that wild animals would not be brought
into the area, and that the ‘future is bright and REDD’.10 Expectations
were then in turn influenced by the early stages of project activity,
which included villagers receiving their first trial payment, the
building of the office and the establishment of some of the livelihood
activities:
‘What made me change [from objecting] is that I received educa-
tion that they will not keep animals again, we will just conserve
forest and water sources only. . . also another thing is after seeing
that they were supporting the construction of this office and also
they promised us they will sell the carbon dioxide and we can get
money that will help to conserve our forest and do village
developments.’11
Although village-level actors had been made aware of the
project timescales during the FPIC process, longer term expecta-
tions related to village development and carbon payments
began to rise. This in turn led to expectations becoming what
Van Lente (2012, p. 773) calls ‘forceful presence’. An‘economy
of expectation’ developed, with new social structures, discourses
and activity emerging, further driving collective expectations of
considerable change (Dressler, 2017). As part of the CBFM land
planning process, Village Land Forest Reserves (VLRFs) were
established, the size of which was decided by village
committees. However, due to the requirements and promises
of REDD+, the communities were encouraged to ‘take on larger
areas of forest under reservation than they would otherwise
have done’.12
Once the VLFR had been gazetted, committees and leaders in
both villages asked people with farms in the reserve areas to leave
(for more on this see Vatn, Kajembe, Mosi, Nantongo, & Silayo,
2017). This illustrates the performative role of expectations in
the displacement of villagers that has been highlighted in relation
to other conservation and development programs (Büscher &
Dressler, 2007; Fairhead, Leach, & Scoones, 2012). In K1, where
the relocations affected more people than in K2, this has resulted
in conflict between village leaders and people refusing to move
from their farms in the VLFR. This conflict was a central part of
many actor narratives in K1, with villagers split between those
who support the moves and those who feel it was unfair. This con-
flict was continuing at the time of data collection (village leaders
estimated about 25 farmers continued to farm in the VLFR), with
threats of violence reported by both parties and farmers being
taken to court.13 In contrast to the experience of Kilosa, very littleKilosa. This could be explained by the fact that they did not include any of the
displaced families in their sample. Data collection timings may also be a factor. They
collected data in 2013 while the project was still underway and so the disappoint-
ments associated with the project ending, and the continued impact of the economy
of expectations in the villages – including conflicts over farms – are likely to have
impacted the way in which people frame their experiences.
16 Interview, national NGO representative, 21 September 2015.
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5.3. Were expectations raised intentionally?
Among policy-makers, project implementers and other
national-level actors, different framings of intentionality in rela-
tion to expectations can be identified, which aligns with different
framings in the STS literature. Some non-NGO actors, who were
not directly involved with implementation of pilot projects, reflect
Brown and Michael (2003) and Sung and Hopkins (2006) in sug-
gesting that expectations were raised intentionally in order to
change behavior among local actors, with one national actor claim-
ing that:
‘Some [NGOs] took the whole concept of carbon credit. . . as a way
to encourage communities to engage in forest management, and to
me that was a false promise’.14
Conversely, other actors, including the implementing NGO in
Kilosa, framed expectations as being an unintended but unavoid-
able consequence of piloting REDD+. For example, NGO practition-
ers reflected that it was hard to communicate the complex concept
of REDD+ to communities in a way that ensured their full under-
standing but didn’t raise expectations. This aligns with the view
of Konrad (2006) that expectations are an inevitable product of
social interactions and processes. FPIC is one such process, which
is intended to deliver full disclosure of all aspects of the project
including benefits, challenges and information about carbon and
the carbon markets, in order that communities are equipped and
empowered to accept or reject the project (Kibuga et al., 2011).
The final report commissioned by the donor claimed that FPIC
‘generated many advantages, among which managing expectations
and mitigating future risks were the most important’ (NIRAS, 2015,
p. 20). It is argued that the fact that some villages in Kilosa rejected
the project demonstrates the effectiveness of FPIC (Vatn et al.,
2017). However, a number of actors reflected that in reality despite
its good intentions, the FPIC process actually increased expecta-
tions among villagers:
‘We studied one criteria called [free] prior informed consent. One is
to be willing without being influenced based on what he sees in the
village. But actually they were influenced by being told that REDD
will bring you this money.’15
Some NGO practitioners raised concerns with FPIC, challenging
its ability to be effective in communicating the complexity of REDD
+, echoing broader discussions about the limitations of the instru-
ment (Mahanty & McDermott, 2013). These reflections on FPIC,
along with other project elements implemented in good faith such
as trial carbon payments, expose an inevitable link or trade-off
inherent in piloting. This is a trade-off between fully piloting
new initiatives, which involves securing high levels of awareness,
engagement and participation, and raising expectations. The com-
parison between the Rungwe project where the NGO did not
achieve high levels of awareness and engagement but experienced
few of the negative impacts of expectations, and the Kilosa project
in which the NGO achieved high levels of awareness, engagement
and expectations, emphasizes the need for recognition of this
trade-off and its potential consequences for villagers.
This trade-off can be positioned as a product of the broader
dynamics of conservation and development. Actors such as NGOs
are required to compete for scarce resources, which requires them
to sell future success to donors and recipients alike (Dressler, 2017;14 Interview, secretariat member, 17 March 2016.
15 Interview, national academic and consultant, 23 February 2016.Li, 1999; Mosse, 2005), or as one NGO representative put it ‘this is
the way the system works – we always write overoptimistic proposals
because you [the donors] demand it from us!’16 Innovative projects
that showcase the new mechanism fully and achieve high levels of
awareness and involvement are judged to be a success (Büscher,
2014; Igoe & Brockington, 2007), with the final REDD+ pilot project
evaluation reports judging the Kilosa project to have been much
more of a success than the Rungwe project (see NIRAS, 2015). Rais-
ing expectations among villagers may not have been intentional, but
it is nonetheless an inevitable consequence of fully piloting new pro-
grams, particularly in relation to market-based mechanisms that are
built around speculative future benefits (Dressler, 2017).
5.4. Hype and disappointment
The actor narratives at the national level reflect a general pat-
tern of rising expectations that then fell significantly over time as
the reality of issues and challenges became clear. Lack of political
will among government officials, lack of donor support post-pilot
and low carbon prices were identified by national and interna-
tional actors as the main causes of the decline in expectations. This
pattern follows the hype and disappointment cycles identified in
the STS literature (Brown & Michael, 2003; Brown, 2003; Konrad,
2006). A number of national actors spoke about their disappoint-
ment that REDD+ had not lived up to its high expectations. Most
of the disappointment however was expressed in relation to vil-
lagers. When data was collected between six and 18 months after
the end of the pilot projects, only a few national actors spoke about
continued expectations of REDD+, and none spoke about experi-
encing ongoing negative personal impacts. National and interna-
tional actors had moved on to other projects and programs, and
many commented that they had not engaged with REDD+ for some
time.
At the time of data collection in Kilosa, the pilot projects had
been completed over a year previously and there were no plans
for continuation of the REDD+ mechanism (e.g. carbon payments).
The villagers received only one trial payment of the expected two,
largely as a result of issues with measurement, and the project had
not got to a stage where it could be verified. One NGO employee
explained that in regards to REDD+ ‘Kilosa’s luck has faded out.’17
Despite this, village level actor narratives did not wholly reflect a
hype and disappointment cycle and different narratives could be
identified. Firstly, some actors did not feel any disappointment due
to their perception that the project had bought many benefits to
them and the village as a whole. These actors were predominately
those who had been heavily involved in the project, whether as vil-
lage leaders, committee members or livelihood project participants.
To them the project had ‘woken up’18 the villagers and had brought
much-needed development and education, and improved forest con-
ditions. A second group of actors, comprised of those less involved in
the project and those affected by the farm relocations in K1,
expressed a strong sense of disappointment in the project:
‘I personally don’t feel good. . . before I thought well of them, that
maybe our village is going to benefit, but for now I see this MKU-
HUMI issue hasn’t any benefit to me’.19
This disappointment was largely in relation to the lack of con-
tinued carbon payments, a feeling of injustice that the project only
benefitted a few people, and the continuing conflict over farm relo-
cations. For some villagers these land issues were framed as a core
part of the legacy of the project, especially when reflecting that ‘if17 Interview, national NGO representative, 20 May 2016.
18 Interview, woman in 60s, village leader, Kilosa, 9 April 2016.
19 Interview, woman in 30s, non-leader, Kilosa, 8 May 2016.
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the project]’.20 The contrasting ways in which the project was framed
within actor narratives reflects their contrasting experience, but may
also be influenced by the way in which they perceived themselves in
relation to the project, expectations and the researcher. By framing
the project as highly successful, those who benefitted most from it
were able to legitimise their roles within the economy of expecta-
tions, shoring up their position in relation to future projects. Simi-
larly, the narratives of those who felt they had not benefitted from
the project reflect their experiences, including their struggles within
the economy of expectations and the desire to benefit more in the
future. These narratives were told in light of ongoing expectations
with regards future carbon payments, which had continued despite
the pilot project ending:
‘. . .they [the villagers] haven’t given up, but you find that when we
go to the public meetings they normally discuss that we were told
that we’d be paid every year. [They ask] what’s going on? Therefore
we normally answer them that after it is being measured it’s taken
to the world market there and they [MKUHUMI] have their process
of discussing it so that the money can be paid. . . it takes time. . .’
(Interviewer) ‘So are you still expecting the second payment?’
‘Yes, that is our hope, because that is what they had promised us’21
West (2006, p. 197) states that ‘people make claims when
something is at stake’. Through the process of narrative interview-
ing, village actors may have been making claims over any future
carbon payments, thus positioning themselves in relation to the
economy of expectations.
The negative impacts associated with hype and disappointment
cycles can therefore be seen to be asymmetrical (Brown & Michael,
2003), as one national NGO representative reflected:
‘For NGOs it’s annoying when you lose money and maybe have to
lay off some staff but they’re professional and they’ll go off and
get another job somewhere else. This is the way the world works.
But those communities that we went out to and said ’hey this is
a new opportunity – and now we can’t make it happen for you.’
That I think is really bad.’22
Although some Kilosa villagers felt they benefitted throughout
the project through things such as trial payments, per diems (for
attending meetings) and training, sacrifices were made in anticipa-
tion of future benefits via carbon payments. These sacrifices
included people being relocated from farms and being permitted
from continuing with certain livelihood practices in the VLFRs. It
is also worth noting at this point, that by not piloting the carbon
payments, the NGO in Rungwe were able to avoid many of the neg-
ative impacts of the hype and disappointment cycle, with one vil-
lage leader reflecting that ‘if everybody [in the village] would have
known about [potential carbon payments] it would have been a prob-
lem. It’s a good thing they didn’t know this’.23 This is not to say that
the approach taken by the Rungwe NGO was without issue, in fact a
number of concerns were identified by the villagers, including in
relation to low levels of project participation and a range of concerns
were identified by villagers. Nonetheless, within this analysis of
expectations, the case of Rungwe provides an interesting contrast
in which donor funds were used largely to expand existing activity.
This comparison brings up issues of responsibility and accountability
for expectations and disappointment, which will be discussed in
more detail in Section 5.6.
However, hype and disappointment cycles can have further
impacts, including the apportioning of blame to certain actors,20 Interview, man in 40s, non-leader, Kilosa, 12 April 2016.
21 Interview, man in 40s, village leader, 14 April 2016.
22 Interview, national NGO representative, 21 September 2015.
23 Interview, man in 40s, village leader, Rungwe, 19 October 2015.damaged credibility and resistance to future innovations (Brown,
2003; Sung & Hopkins, 2006; Van Lente, 1993). At the national
level actors directed their disappointment in a number of ways.
Some blamed the fact that the donors ‘walked away’.24 Other actors
blame the ‘top-down’ approach of REDD+ ‘convincing people to do
what they want them to do’,25 which for some actors included criti-
cism of a lack of resources allocated to district and local government.
A number of national actors, including national government officials,
NGOs and academics were critical of the use of pilots in the future
and some reflected that maybe the NGO implementing the Rungwe
project took the right approach, avoiding expectations and using the
money to continue existing work. However Borup et al. (2006) argue
that criticism and disillusionment following hype and disappoint-
ment can quickly be pushed aside in the face of a new innovation
and new hype. In the future-oriented world of conservation and
development where actors have to compete for scarce resources,
the hype of new programs that come with promises of multiple-
win solutions and donor support may override the critical learning
from the REDD+ pilot process (Mosse, 2005; Redford et al., 2013).
In Kilosa, the longer-term impacts of the hype and disappoint-
ment cycle of the REDD+ pilot projects were still not fully evident
at the time of data collection. However, actor narratives indicated
that the experience of the REDD+ pilots had not led to resistance to
future projects, although there was a desire for future projects to
be done differently among those who felt disappointed. As one
K1 farmer still in dispute with village leaders over farming in the
VLFR explained:
‘It’s not that we [would] refuse the projects, we [would] accept the
projects to come. They should come but we must make sure we’ve
sat down and plan for that project, together with the village
government.’26
This perspective may to some extent be a product of the fact
that this was the first large international forest conservation pro-
ject implemented with these villages. In situations where multiple
previous projects have come and gone, and more hype and disap-
pointment experienced, more evidence of resistance can be found
(Leach & Scoones, 2015; West, 2006). In relation to electronic tech-
nology, Konrad (2006) finds that hype and disappointment can
lead to damage to the credibility and legitimacy of innovators. In
Kilosa, those most disappointed with the project largely blamed
local leaders for project failures, as opposed to the implementing
NGO. As such it appears that the credibility of the NGO remains
intact, which may be due to the fact that they have maintained a
presence in the villages and have introduced a new sustainable
charcoal project. NGOs face a significant challenge in situations
such as this, maintaining their credibility and legitimacy among
village level actors while engaging with ever more uncertain global
mechanisms such as REDD+ (Dressler, 2017).
5.5. The social dynamics and ‘management’ of expectations
The way that different actors and actor groups framed and
understood expectations in relation to the REDD+ pilot projects
depended on their own individual circumstances, and factors such
as their past experiences, social context, personal values and the
different ways in which they view or know the world (Leach &
Scoones, 2015; Sung & Hopkins, 2006). In Kilosa the villager narra-
tives suggested that the fact that the REDD+ pilot project was the
first major donor-funded project, and as such an unknown entity,
influenced perceptions. This can be evidenced through the high
expectations that surfaced for actors during the early project24 Interview, national NGO representative, 21 September 2015.
25 Interview, national government official and Task Force member, 24 May 2016.
26 Interview, man in 30s, non-leader, Kilosa, April 9 2016.
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also be the case that in Rungwe the long history of conservation and
development interventions and the longstanding relationship
between the villages and the NGO contributed to the low impact
and expectations there. Actors in Kilosa also framed project concepts
with their own ways of knowing, for example the framing of the pro-
cess of ‘harvesting of carbon air’.28 This framing of carbon as tangible
and sellable subsequently influenced ongoing expectations in rela-
tion to payments.
The experience that people had during the project itself also
influenced the way they framed expectations and disappointment
(Brown & Michael, 2003). As we have previously identified, those
most closely involved with the project put less emphasis on the
lack of continued trial payments and as such experienced less dis-
appointment. Conversely, those less involved in the livelihood pro-
jects or those who had experienced negative personal impacts
focused more on the unfulfilled promises of the project. In K2,
where the NGO had brought in a new sustainable charcoal project,
MKUHUMI was framed by some as continuing under a different
guise. This in turn impacted expectations, with one villager
explaining that in the future he expected that ‘this MKUHUMI will
just be changing its name’29 but would keep going. We can therefore
see that expectations are continually influencing and being influ-
enced by social interactions and experiences (Konrad, 2006) and as
a product of the economy of expectations (Dressler, 2017). This evi-
dence also shows that when reflecting on expectations and disap-
pointment, actors re-frame their experience in light of what
actually happened and in light of their personal experience (Brown
& Michael, 2003). Practitioners need, therefore, to be mindful that
no matter how they frame pilot projects to communities, the social
dynamics and economy of expectations will be unpredictable, mak-
ing expectations unmanageable once raised (Weszkalnys, 2008).
NGO practitioners involved in the Kilosa pilot project described
how they tried to manage expectations around REDD+ and carbon
payments as the project developed. One NGO practitioner described
how they tried to focus on ‘the conservation parts and other co-
benefits that they received’, but noted that despite these efforts
‘. . .we really could not control that [expectations] – there were a few
members who. . . really had high expectations.’30 This further empha-
sizes the aforementioned trade-off between raising awareness and
raising expectations.
5.6. Knowledge, uncertainty and expectations
Brown and Michael (2003) argue that actors with close proxim-
ity to knowledge production have higher levels of uncertainty and
lower expectations, while actors further away from knowledge
production have low uncertainty and high expectations. Those
closest to the production of REDD+ and pilot project knowledge
reflected on low expectations and high uncertainty, which as we
have discussed was cited by some as rationale for piloting, and
low expectations. This included actors with international links,
including from the UN, the donor (embassy), international NGOs,
universities and consultancies.
‘I guess like everybody I still really am not sure that I think [REDD+]
is going to work at the national level. I think that it’s a rather dis-
tant pipe dream and I very much thought so at that point [the
start].’3127 Interview, woman in 40s, village leader, Kilosa, 6 May 2016.
28 Interview, woman in 30s, Kilosa, 7 May 2016.
29 Interview, man in 30s, village leader, Kilosa, 6 May 2016.
30 Interview, national NGO representative, 8 March 2016.
31 Interview, international consultant, 6 March 2016.Among government officials at national and district scales, who
can be seen to be further from the production of knowledge around
REDD+, there is some evidence of higher expectations and lower
uncertainty, particularly in relation to continuation post-pilot:
‘You can pilot and you can forget. But our idea was to do something
and then. . . repeat from there. . . After knowing what really works
you do something afterwards’32
However despite this, members of the Task Force were con-
cerned about the speed at which the pilot projects were unfolding,
challenging the testing of benefits at the village level when there
was uncertainty as to whether there would be REDD+ benefits
long-term.
Local NGO project implementers reflected on their personal
uncertainties and described how they tried to communicate them
to villagers:
‘Even us ourselves we were not sure about this carbon credit. We
were explaining to [the villagers] that this is something new so
we are not sure. Even myself, I have been asking that hmmmwhere
will this lot of money come from. Where?’33
However as we have discussed, expectations rose quickly
among villagers, despite attempts to manage them. As such, the
Kilosa villagers, who were furthest from the production of knowl-
edge, had the highest expectations and the lowest levels of uncer-
tainty, thus aligning with the pattern identified by Brown (2003).
West (2006) finds that villagers engage with all conservation and
development projects on the understanding that they are entering
into long-term, reciprocal social relationships with practitioners.
Even though the villagers in Kilosa were told that the project
was time-limited, it appears that they did indeed perceive their
involvement as longer term, which it is likely will also be influ-
enced by the nature of the REDD+ mechanism and its emphasis
on future benefits (Dressler, 2017).
In light of the analysis in this paper, issues of accountability in
relation to expectations in conservation and development policy
and practice are raised. This is particularly salient in relation to
transparency, responsiveness and liability, which are defined as
three of the five dimensions of accountability (Koppell, 2005). In
this context, transparency can be seen to be concerned with how
project uncertainties (held by those producing the knowledge
and leading conservation and development programs) can be bet-
ter communicated to those furthest away from knowledge produc-
tion, such as Kilosa villagers (Brown, 2003). This would require a
significantly increased level of caution at the start of projects to
reduce hype. The challenge for this, however, is that the ‘success’
of projects relies on hype, raising expectations and the enrolment
of actors into communities of promise (Brown, 2003; Büscher,
2014; Mosse, 2005). This again speaks to the need for the trade-
off between piloting and raising expectations to be seriously con-
sidered by conservation and development policy-makers and prac-
titioners, which includes challenging the discourse of ‘needing’ to
pilot new program ideas.
Responsiveness refers to whether stakeholder expectations
have been met, and liability is concerned with whether conse-
quences were faced by implementing organisations for any short-
falls (Koppell, 2005). The NGO implementing the Kilosa pilot
project (along with other implementing NGOs, as reported by their
national representatives within this research), were responsive to
the expectations of the donor by fully testing the REDD+ mecha-
nism and delivering on project objectives. It can also be argued that
the NGOs were liable in relation to their donor accountability,32 Interview, government official and Task Force member, 3 March 2016.
33 Interview, NGO project implementer, Kilosa, 31 March 2016.
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objectives. As such, the NGO in Rungwe were criticised for not fully
testing the REDD+ mechanism and were challenged by the donors
for their choice to use the money to continue with their ‘core busi-
ness’34 instead of pushing the REDD+ agenda; a choice the NGO took
partly due to fears around village-level expectations. The fact that
the NGOs have continued to work with communities after the
REDD+ pilots through new funding and projects demonstrates their
responsiveness to the needs and expectations of the villagers. How-
ever, broader accountability for the fact that the REDD+ pilot projects
did not meet villager expectations has not been taken, or formally
discussed, by the donors and policy-makers who have driven the
REDD+ agenda internationally and in Tanzania. Similarly, liability
for the disappointment for unfulfilled expectations at the village
level has not been taken. This therefore highlights the need for more
accountability to be taken by those closest to the production of
knowledge for the (unfulfilled) expectations of those furthest away
from knowledge production, such as villagers. This echoes wider
calls for a shift in how accountability is dealt with in conservation
and development policy and practice (cf. Brechin, Wilshusen,
Fortwangler, & West, 2002; Campese, 2009; Jepson, 2005).6. Conclusions
By applying concepts from the sociology of expectations to the
case study of REDD+ pilot projects in Tanzania, we have con-
tributed new insights into the dynamics of expectations in the con-
text of conservation and development pilot projects. By exploring
expectations in this way we have also contributed new insights
into the understanding of pilot projects, and interventions more
broadly, as agents and outcomes of social change. The case of
REDD+ in Tanzania demonstrates the important role of hyper
expectations in new international conservation and development
programs, driving and being driven by a desire for new multiple-
win approaches to forest governance, a perceived need for speed,
and high estimations of future success. These expectations can be
seen as being highly performative, mobilising resources and driv-
ing communities of promise among conservation and development
professionals. We therefore add insights into the growing critical
discussion of conservation fads (Fletcher et al., 2016; Redford
et al., 2013), by unpacking the performative role of expectations
in this process. High levels of uncertainty existed among those
closest to the production of knowledge, yet instead of promoting
caution, this uncertainty contributed to a perceived urgency to test
the mechanism and drove the ‘need’ to implement pilot projects.
This process can be seen to be a product of what Lund et al.
(2016, p. 133) refer to as conservation and development ‘logic’ that
‘continuously produces and feeds off the development and testing
of new policy models.’
Through exploration of two very different REDD+ pilot projects,
we have identified a trade-off between fully testing pilot projects
and raising awareness, and raising expectations at the village level.
Comparing these two NGOs is not done with the intention of judg-
ing or evaluating the NGO approaches or the projects themselves,
rather it provides an interesting comparison in relation to expecta-
tions. In Kilosa, where the NGO achieved high awareness and high
participation in the pilot project, we have shown how an economy
of expectations developed (Dressler, 2017). Expectations were
raised through project activity, including through well-
intentioned activities such as FPIC and testing benefit-sharing
mechanisms. Expectations then became a forceful presence (Van
Lente, 2012), leading to significant social change, including people
being relocated from farms. Expectations interact and are medi-34 Interview, consultant, 7 September 2015.ated by local realities, and so are difficult to manage once raised.
A hype and disappointment cycle was identified in Kilosa and
expectations have continued to impact villagers after the pilot pro-
ject finished and the international and national actors have moved
on. Conversely in Rungwe, where the market-based aspects of
REDD+ were not tested (due to uncertainty about the future of
the mechanism and concerns about expectations), there were
few expectations and so little evidence of disappointment. Perhaps
these two cases reflect the different approaches that the two NGOs
take in relation to the challenge of maintaining legitimacy with vil-
lage level actors while engaging with ever more uncertain interna-
tional pograms in the competition for funding (Dressler, 2017).
Our findings therefore highlight some core issues for conserva-
tion and development and support calls for more critical reflection
of how conservation is pursued, particularly in relation to how new
international programs such as REDD+ are managed (Fletcher et al.,
2016; Lund et al., 2016). Expectation and disappointment cycles
can be conceptualized as an unintended consequence of piloting
new international conservation and development programs, par-
ticularly in relation to future-oriented, market-based programs
such as REDD+ (Dressler, 2017; Igoe & Brockington, 2007). How-
ever, although unintended, expectations are inevitable, which the
trade-off identified in this research demonstrates. The negative
outcomes of hype and disappointment cycles are asymmetric; pro-
duced by those closest to the production of knowledge and yet
impacting those furthest away from knowledge production the
most (Brown, 2003). This is particularly salient in relation to pilot
projects, which are framed as a short-term test by international
actors but seen by local actors as being the start of a longer-
term, reciprocal relationship (West, 2006). Accountability for
expectations is therefore needed in conservation policy and prac-
tice, particularly on the part of those closest to the production of
knowledge, such as policy-makers and donors. This includes the
need for more transparency around uncertainty from the start,
more responsiveness to villager expectations and liability being
taken for unfulfilled expectations. To this end, we challenge the
discourse of ‘needing’ to pilot, which prioritizes awareness, impact
and innovation without fully considering the potential negative
impact of unfulfilled expectations.
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